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By Salah Bayaziddi, Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan Representative to the U.S.
The early stages of this year’s confrontation between Iran and an American-Israeli axis exposed a reality many policymakers in Washington and Europe have long avoided confronting: the Islamic Republic’s vulnerability when under pressure simultaneously from outside and within the country.
During those critical weeks, several armed forces of Iranian Kurdish political parties signaled their readiness to intensify operations against Tehran if meaningful international support was provided. Despite what many viewed as a historic opening, hesitation and strategic ambiguity from Western governments prevented the emergence of a coordinated internal front against the regime.
The question now is whether that opportunity has passed—or whether the United States and its allies should reconsider their approach toward Iran’s opposition movements.
For decades, Iranian Kurdish political parties, including the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) and the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan, have resisted the Islamic Republic both politically and militarily. Unlike many fragmented opposition groups abroad, Kurdish organizations maintain networks inside Iran, possess experienced fighters and organizational structures, and retain deep familiarity with the terrain and political dynamics in western Iran.
When tensions escalated in March this year, Kurdish opposition figures within a newly formed alliance of six political parties communicated to Western interlocutors that they were prepared to expand operations against the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Their message was straightforward: no internal uprising could survive without external assistance.
Reported requests included intelligence sharing, anti-drone systems, communications equipment, defensive air protection, and political assurances regarding long-term support. These requests reflected military realities rather than ambition alone. The Islamic Republic still commands one of the largest missile and drone arsenals in the Middle East, alongside extensive IRGC ground forces and allied militias capable of suppressing isolated rebellions.
Kurdish groups argued that without protection from Iranian airstrikes and drone attacks, any major offensive to secure the Kurdistan region of Iran risked ending as previous uprisings had—with devastating retaliation against Kurdish civilian areas and refugee communities outside the country.
Western governments ultimately declined to move. Although U.S. officials publicly voiced support for the Iranian people and condemned repression, no coordinated strategy emerged to integrate Kurdish forces or other opposition groups into a broader pressure campaign against Tehran. Concerns over escalation, regional fragmentation, and uncertainty surrounding a potential collapse of the Islamic Republic contributed to Washington’s reluctance.
That hesitation may have prevented the emergence of the most serious internal challenge the regime has faced in decades.
Critics of supporting Kurdish armed groups warn that such a policy could fuel instability or encourage separatism. However, many Kurdish opposition leaders increasingly frame their struggle not as a campaign for partition, but as part of a broader democratic movement against authoritarian rule in Tehran. Their demands center on federalism, decentralization, democratic representation in a unified Iran, and an end to the systematic repression of peripheral regions.
Meanwhile, the assumption that avoiding engagement with opposition movements preserves regional stability has repeatedly proven questionable. The Islamic Republic itself remains one of the Middle East’s principal sources of instability through its sponsorship of proxy militias, missile proliferation, hostage diplomacy, and maritime threats. Domestic repression has also intensified dramatically since the “Woman, Life, Freedom” protests, during which thousands of Iranians were arrested and hundreds killed.
The reality is that meaningful political change inside Iran is unlikely to emerge solely through sanctions or diplomacy. Internal resistance movements—including Kurdish political organizations—remain among the few forces capable of directly challenging the regime’s security apparatus on the ground.
Any future strategy, however, would need to avoid repeating the mistakes of past regional interventions. External support should be carefully structured, explicitly tied to democratic principles, and oriented toward a pluralistic political transition rather than armed fragmentation.
In practical terms, this could involve secure communications technology for activists, intelligence cooperation against IRGC operations, stronger protections for refugee communities in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, and defensive capabilities for political organizations facing repeated missile and drone attacks. If military confrontation escalates again in the future, policymakers may also revisit discussions surrounding limited air-defense support for vulnerable opposition-held areas.
Kurdish political parties alone cannot transform Iran. Any serious challenge to the Islamic Republic would require broader coordination among Kurds, Baluch, Azeri Turks, Persians, labor activists, students, women’s organizations, and dissident networks across the country. The protest movements of recent years demonstrated clearly that dissatisfaction with the regime extends far beyond any single ethnic or political constituency.
This year’s war has demonstrated that the Islamic Republic is not invincible. It also showed how quickly opportunities for political transformation could disappear when opposition movements lack international support.
Whether U.S. policymakers choose to revisit those lessons remains uncertain.
What is clear, however, is that many Iranian opposition groups—particularly Kurdish organizations—believe the possibility for change has not passed. We argue that Tehran’s leadership is weaker, more isolated, and more internally contested than at any point in decades.
The central question now is no longer whether opposition to the Islamic Republic exists inside Iran. The question is whether the United States and international community is prepared to engage seriously with the forces willing to confront the regime, or whether another historic opportunity will once again be allowed to pass.
Salah Bayaziddi is the US Representative of the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan. Following the Iranian revolution in 1979, Mr. Bayaziddi as a young sympathizer joined the Komala Party and became an activist in the Kurdish struggle against the Iranian government. In 1982, government security forces arrested him. Mr. Bayaziddi survived over two years of torture and solitary confinement for his beliefs in a free and democratic Iran based on equality for all ethnic and religious groups including Kurds. Following Mr. Bayaziddi’s release from prison, he was under strict watch by government security agencies. From 1984 to 1990, he was deprived the right to study, the right to work and the right to travel outside Iran. In 1990, Mr. Bayaziddi escaped Iran through the mountains of Turkey. In Ankara, he applied for and was accepted as a new Canadian immigrant through the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. In 1991, Mr. Bayaziddi resettled in Toronto. He has been active in Kurdish causes and human rights in Iran for over 35 years. Following Komala Party’s 14th Congress in 2013 and its 15th Congress in 2017, Mr. Bayaziddi was elected to a leadership position as a member of its Central Committee. Mr. Bayaziddi has a PhD from NSU Florida; an MA in International Relations from Brock University, and a BA in Political Science from York University in Canada.
