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Reprinted with permission•Mises Wire•Lipton Matthews
China’s rise is often portrayed as unstoppable. It dominates global supply chains, pours money into research and development (R&D), and boasts some of the world’s largest tech companies. But scratch beneath the surface of this economic juggernaut, and a picture of structural inefficiencies, inflated innovation claims, and deep technological dependencies emerges. For all its ambition, China is caught in a trap: it is trying to act like a high-tech superpower while stuck with the productivity levels and export profile of a middle-income country.
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The reality is this: China’s economic stature is overrated. Despite heavy investments in technology, its economy suffers from a persistent productivity problem. Its exports are still centered around low- to mid-value goods, and its much-hyped artificial intelligence (AI) sector is more about state direction than spontaneous innovation. Follow, as we explore how China’s economic strengths are vastly exaggerated by examining three areas: productivity performance, the composition of its exports, and the realities behind its AI development.
Total factor productivity (TFP) is a key measure of how efficiently an economy uses its inputs such as labor and capital to produce output. It reflects the true contribution of innovation, technology, and efficiency to economic growth. In China’s case, TFP has been sluggish or even declining, despite years of rising R&D spending, more university graduates, and an explosion in scientific papers and patents.
This is what economists Alexander Hammer and Shahid Yusuf have called a “high-tech, low-productivity trap.” In their analysis for the US International Trade Commission, they note that while China has invested heavily in building technological capacity through initiatives like “Made in China 2025,” these efforts have failed to deliver significant productivity gains. China’s economic growth is slowing, and the returns on its investment-heavy strategy are diminishing.
One of the core problems lies in how innovation is managed. Much of China’s R&D spending is directed by the state or influenced by political incentives. State-owned or state-affiliated enterprises are often the biggest recipients of funding, which leads to inefficiencies and duplication. Instead of fostering open competition and entrepreneurial experimentation, the system favors companies with political connections and access to subsidies.
Basic research—the kind that lays the groundwork for transformative technologies—is underfunded in China. It made up only about 6 percent of total R&D spending in 2020, compared to more than 20 percent in many developed economies. Without basic science, it’s difficult to produce the kinds of groundbreaking discoveries that shift the technological frontier.
The political and regulatory environment further hampers innovation. As Alicia García-Herrero and Robin Schindowski explain in a recent assessment, China’s institutional reforms have slowed, and the regulatory landscape has become more complex. Centralized agencies, like the Cyberspace Administration of China, exercise sweeping authority over tech firms, creating uncertainty, and discouraging risk-taking. At the local level, firms often rely on personal ties to government officials, limiting opportunities for newcomers to compete on equal terms.
These institutional hurdles are compounded by social changes. Youth unemployment has approached double digits, and many young Chinese are choosing the stability of civil service jobs over starting businesses. This shift in career preferences undermines the government’s goal of building a dynamic, innovation-driven economy. One way to gauge a country’s technological sophistication is to look at what it exports. High-tech economies tend to dominate in complex, high-value goods such as advanced machinery, pharmaceuticals, and precision electronics. China, despite its manufacturing scale, still relies heavily on exporting low- to medium-value products.
This matters because it shows where the real innovation is or isn’t. China might assemble iPhones, but the high-value components and intellectual property often come from elsewhere. According to the research paper by García-Herrero and Schindowski, even though the domestic value-added share of exports has improved, China remains dependent on foreign technology for key inputs, especially in sectors like semiconductors. In fact, China’s productivity growth has fallen behind, not just advanced economies, but also some developing countries.
For example, India—despite spending far less on R&D—has recently outpaced China in TFP growth. This suggests that throwing money at science and technology does not automatically lead to better economic performance, especially when innovation is shaped more by state control than market feedback. This export structure also reflects the limitations of China’s industrial strategy. Despite enormous funding and long-term plans, China has yet to dominate in areas that define global technological leadership. While it is a major manufacturer, it remains at the middle rungs of the value chain.
Perhaps the most hyped symbol of China’s supposed technological dominance is its ambition to lead in artificial intelligence. In 2017, the State Council released a sweeping AI plan, aiming to make China the world’s AI leader by 2030. Since then, many have speculated that China is surging ahead in the global AI race.
But much of this narrative is overstated. Jeffrey Ding’s in-depth analysis—“Deciphering China’s AI Dream”—offers a more realistic picture. He developed an AI Potential Index to compare countries’ capabilities and found that China’s overall AI strength is only about half that of the United States. China trails in key areas like cutting-edge hardware and foundational research. Its only clear advantage is in access to data, due to its large population and looser privacy norms.
What China does well in AI is scale and government coordination. The state supports AI firms through funding, policies, and favorable regulation. An example is DeepSeek, usually described as China’s answer to ChatGPT. But DeepSeek is not the product of an open, competitive ecosystem. It is a subsidized project, backed by state support, closely modeled on existing Western tools. While technically impressive, it doesn’t represent a leap forward in innovation.
Rather than fostering breakthroughs, China’s AI sector often focuses on adapting existing technologies to serve domestic policy goals—especially surveillance and social management. This raises doubts about whether China’s AI advances will translate into global leadership in commercial or scientific innovation.
At the same time, government intervention in AI is increasing. Local governments and state-owned firms are investing billions into AI startups, often through public-private partnerships. These “government guidance funds” can crowd out private capital and encourage speculative overinvestment, potentially leading to bubbles rather than sustained progress.
China has achieved remarkable economic progress over the past few decades. But its claim to technological supremacy and innovation leadership remains far from realized. Productivity growth is weak, its exports still rely on foreign inputs, and its AI sector is driven more by policy than by independent discovery.
For all the patents, R&D spending, and strategic plans, China has yet to crack the core challenge of becoming a truly innovative economy. Without structural reforms to encourage competition, invest in basic research, and allow bottom-up innovation to thrive, China risks stagnating just below the technology frontier.
The global conversation about China’s rise needs to catch up with this more nuanced reality. The country is large and ambitious, but its economic power is not as deep or advanced as it may appear. Recognizing this isn’t about underestimating China—it’s about seeing the real constraints it faces in becoming a world-class innovator.
When a government props up an economy both directly and indirectly, it stifles innovation by removing incentives and encouraging conformity.
Do NOT underestimate China's military power! They have actually been at war with the US for over 40 years now. Their attacks have been subtle but in the long run (China's plan) they have reduced the US to an almost 3rd world military power. Here's some examples:
Cultural war. China has been quietly funding and organizing civil unrest along with cultural changes for almost 40 years now. Utilizing college professors and later leaders from every facet of the US along with legacy media personalities; they have quietly applied what they learned in their cultural revolution and modified those lessons to appeal to American youth.
To quote Sun Tzu: "Give me three generations of your youth and I will rule your country".
Military power:
China has been not so quietly building up a world conquering military. Additionally in doing so, they have crippled the US's military capabilities by stealing and copying our cutting edge secrets and hardware. One of their greatest accomplishments has been to cripple our military maritime construction by quietly buying up the majority of high quality scrap steel and working with various leaders to pass laws and place severe restrictions (EPS, OSHA etc) on the steel industry.
This has literally crippled our ability to mine, smelt and forge new steel. At THIS VERY MOMENT, the US shipbuilding industry and it's suppliers CANNOT BUY ENOUGH STEEL TO BUILD NEW SHIPS OR SUBS FOR OUR NAVY! This in not hyperbole or propaganda but a fact passed on too me through various sources in that industry.
Now, leadership.
As far as I can tell, China started a little program about 40 years ago called "Capture". The goal was to "capture" leaders from every facet of America (corporations, local, state and national levels along with anybody else) who could advance laws, mandates and restrictions that furthered China's interests.
They used "honeypot" blackmail schemes, bribes, lucrative contracts, massive election donations, sex vacations and everything else that they could think of to "capture" targeted leaders.
Lastly, bio-warfare. Now it's no secret that COVID and it's related vaccines were developed for nefarious purposes. Theories abound, but I'll leave it to you to decide exactly why. Now there's another variant that has been released and I'm sure a new wonder vaccine is right around the corner.
And from the headlines this week, Chinese college students were caught with a fast spreading fungus that kills our primary agricultural crops. This is only one instance, who knows how many other bio weapons have been brought into the US over the decades? Think about how many military age Chinese men are in America and maybe we should be looking a little closer at the possibilities of hundreds if not thousands of heavily armed "sleeper cells" are just waiting for the "GO" signal.
Speaking of sleeper cells, who remembers a couple of years back when all those food processing facilities were exploding and burning to the ground? Please keep in mind that it takes YEARS to rebuild such a facility and have it up and running at full capacity again. Just food for though.
My apologies for writing what amounts to a whole article, but we should never underestimate the abilities of a declared enemy. Hardly any of the above is speculation, it has been taken from the headlines over the last decade or so.